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INTRODUCTION
At the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a decisionmaking technique called “systems analysis” was perfected and began to be applied
broadly to matters of national defense strategy and government policy. The brain child of
the RAND Corporation, systems analysis extended the logic of “operations research,”
which had been developed during World War II, from its earlier narrow focus on weapon
systems to broader matters of defense strategy, government, and social policy. The
systems analytic approach, as its name suggests, would focus on a particular social
system, identify the objectives of that particular system, and compare and evaluate the
possible alternative ways of optimizing those objectives.
Systems analysis had a formative impact on government decision-making and on
the field of public policy. In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara imposed
the method of systems analysis broadly on defense department decision-making, from
weapon systems procurement to national defense strategy, under the rubric of “Planning,
Programming, Budgeting Systems analysis” or “PPBS.” Within a few years, President
Lyndon B. Johnson directed his budget director to implement PPBS throughout all
federal agencies, extending the reach of systems analytic methods throughout the federal
government. A series of executive orders under Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan,
and Bill Clinton would further entrench the use of systems analytic techniques, as would
developments in schools of public policy.
Systems analysis would also significantly shape the field of criminal justice. It is
largely responsible for crystalizing the notion of a “criminal justice system” that, today,
grounds practically all research and practice in the area. Because of this, systems analysis
had an important influence on the field of criminal law and criminal procedure. It
contributed to a significant shift away from viewing the criminal sanction as an exercise
of sovereign right to viewing it instead within a systems analytic framework. Relatedly, it
influenced and helped shape a style of judicial decision-making and legal reasoning.
Precisely when systems analysis was in crescendo in the 1960s, a number of
judges and legal scholars began to embrace a systems analytic approach to judicial
decision-making and legal reasoning. It is an approach that assumes the existence of a
“criminal justice system,” with particular functions and objectives, and that orients itself
toward optimizing those systemic objectives. The approach can take either of two forms:
(1) what I would call an “internal” approach in which the judicial decision-maker views
him or herself and the surrounding legal structures (the legal institutions and practices) as
2

an integral part of the “criminal justice system” and consequently tries to optimize the
functioning of that integrated system with the objective, say, of controlling crime,
improving the efficient management of populations, or otherwise enhancing the
functionality of the system; and (2) what I would call an “external” form in which the
judicial decision-maker views him or herself and other legal actors as outsiders to the
“criminal justice system” and consequently defers to the actors within the system (such as
the police, corrections officials, parole board, etc.).
The reliance on systems analytic reasoning in criminal law and criminal
procedure, however, reproduces a number of the technical weaknesses of systems
analysis. More specifically, the adoption of a systems analytic approach privileges
systems-related interests, particularly the more quantifiable ones, over the competing
concerns that are at issue in the context of the criminal sanction—and it does so under the
guise of neutral and objective science. In elevating systems-related interests over other
values, it produces a false dichotomy between objective system needs and subjective
values that is fundamentally corrosive to the decision-making process and to the larger
social outcomes, because it prevents a full articulation, open discussion, and
comprehensive weighing of the values that ground our constitutional union.
Exploring the influence of systems analytic reasoning on criminal law and
procedure and identifying the specific flaws of systems analysis may allow us to move
beyond this problematic style of judicial decision-making. Specifically, by thinking
critically about the technical weaknesses of systems analysis, we may be able to move
past the systems analytic approach toward a more capacious and promising way to
theorize and resolve matters of crime and punishment: a way forward that would
effectively discard the misleading notion of a “criminal justice system” in order to
embrace a wider consideration of the values that are implicated by the criminal sanction.

I. THE EMERGENCE AND RISE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Military weapon systems analysis, or what was originally called “Operations
Research,” or simply “OR,” was developed during World War II as a way to “provide
quantitative aids to defense decision makers” with the goal of “optimizing the operational
employment of existing weapons (or other military) systems.” 2 The “distinctive
approach,” according to the Operational Research Society of Great Britain, was “to
develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating measurements of factors such as
change and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcomes of alternative
decisions, strategies or controls.” 3 Famous early applications of operations research
2

Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 6.
3
In the United Kingdom, where OR largely originated, it was called “operational research.” This definition
is from the Operational Research Society of Great Britain, Operational Research Quarterly, 13(3):282
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included studies of the placement and use of aircraft-detection radar devices and of antisubmarine tactics involving depth-charge explosions in the early phases of the Second
World War.4 Eventually, operations research would apply the same mathematical
algorithms and models to larger management problems, such as the efficient
determination of transportation routes or warehouse stock control. 5 From this larger
perspective, operations research can best be understood, again in the words of the
Operational Research Society of Great Britain, as “the attack of modern science on
complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men,
machines, materials and money in industry, business, government and defense…. The
purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically.” 6 The only
question is how to optimize efficiency where the measure of efficiency is clearly defined,
or, as Edward S. Quade of the RAND Corporation would explain, how “to increase the
efficiency of a man-machine system in a situation where it is clear what ‘more efficient’
means.” 7
During the 1950s, Quade, Alain Enthoven, Charles Hitch, and others at the
RAND Corporation would extend this method of analysis from the narrow field of
operations research, where it had originated, to defense strategy more broadly—
essentially, from deciding, for instance, the optimal altitude for a bombing mission to
determining broader nuclear engagement policies. The broader application would become
known as “Systems Analysis.” Systems analysis was often confused with operations
research, from which it evolved, but it was distinct in several regards. Operations
research tended to have more elaborate mathematical models and solved lower level
problems; 8 in systems analysis, by contrast, the pure mathematical computation was
generally applied only to subparts of the overall problem. Moreover, systems analysis
took on larger strategic questions that implicate choices between major policy options. In
this sense, systems analysis was, from its inception, “less quantitative in method and
more oriented toward the analysis of broad strategic and policy questions, [...]
particularly […] seeking to clarify choice under conditions of great uncertainty.” 9

(1962),
available
in
the
Glossary
of
Cybernetics
and
Systems
http://www.wata.cc/forums/uploaded/136_1167433681.pdf. For a history of Operations Research, see
Maurice W. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to
1970, Imperial College Press 2003; S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War
Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
4
Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, pp. 6-7.
5
Edward S. Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting. Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corp., 1966; p. 3.
6
Operational Research Quarterly, 13(3): 282 (1962).
7
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 3.
8
Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, p. 8.
9
Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, p. 8
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A. The Logic of Systems Analysis
The logic of systems analysis is simple and was depicted, most clearly, in a
RAND model, Figure 1 of Edward Quade’s RAND Report P-3322 on “Systems Analysis
Techniques for Planning-Programming-Budgeting” from March 1966. 10 Quade’s
graphics capture best the five key steps of the analytic decision-making method
developed in the 1950s and 60s—a method that privileged quantification, modeling,
statistical analysis, and a cost-benefit approach.
By way of background and motivating the model, the decision-maker had to have
identified a particular problem to address within a particular social sphere—or
“system”—and to have a clear idea of the system’s objectives. With the objectives in
mind, the decision-maker would then set the proper criterion to evaluate different
promising policy alternatives. There would be five steps to the process:

Step 1, the input, is the set of promising policy alternatives, each of which could
possibly advance the objectives of the system. Each alternative policy is then filtered
through a model or a set of models to assess its individual attributes in terms, for
example, of maintenance costs, manpower requirements, communication capabilities, etc.
This produces each policy’s level of effectiveness and cost, which can then be compared
using a metric, “the criterion,” which will turn out, as the output, the relative rank of each
policy compared to the others. The output, in the far right column at step 5, is the correct
10

Edward S. Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting. Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corp., 1966.
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ordinal ranking of the policy alternatives—or what is, in effect, a full ranking of “The
ALTERNATIVES in order of Preference.” 11
In order to perfect the method, the operation can be reiterated, testing for
sensitivity, questioning assumptions, reexamining objectives, exploring new alternatives,
and tweaking the model again and again: 12

Edward Quade of the RAND Corporation would present his model of a policymachine—or, in his words, what “is frequently called a cost-effectiveness analysis… or,
alternatively, cost-utility and cost-benefit analyses” 13—to federal bureaucrats in a course
titled “Executive Orientation in Planning, Programming, and Budgeting” sponsored by
the United States Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service Commission in late
February 1966. “Our purpose,” Quade emphasized, “is to discuss the question of
11

Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 9.
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, pp. 10-11.
13
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 5 and n.*
12
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extending military systems analysis to the civilian activities of the government.” 14 Quade
would offer this concise definition of systems analysis:
A systems analysis is an analytic study designed to help a decision maker identify
a preferred choice among possible alternatives. It is characterized by a systematic
and rational approach, with assumptions made explicit, objectives and criteria
clearly defined, and alternative courses of action compared in the light of their
possible consequences. An effort is made to use quantitative methods but
computers are not essential. What is essential is a model that enables expert
intuition and judgment to be applied efficiently. 15
As this definition makes clear, there are two connotations to the term “systems”
embedded in systems analysis: first, there is the idea that there exists a subset of practices
and institutions that relate to each other as a “system” and that need to be analyzed
separately from other social practices and institutions. Along this first dimension, the
analysis focuses on a particular system—such as health care or criminal justice—in order
to optimize its functionality. Second, there is the notion of “systems analysis” that
involves a particular type of analysis—concerning a model and criterion—of an
identified social problem. Though they can be distinguished, these two connotations are
imbricated and are both integral parts of the systems analytic approach: the central idea,
in effect, is to choose a policy that will maximize the functionality of a system.
B. The Expansion of Systems Analysis
Secretary of Defense McNamara would impose systems analysis under the rubric
of “Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems” analysis on all military procurement and
defense strategy immediately upon taking office under President Kennedy in 1961. That
first round of expansion—from narrow operations research on weapons systems to
broader applications of systems analysis of defense strategy—generated a lot of
resistance within the military establishment, targeted primarily at the controversial figure
of McNamara himself. But, in Quade’s opinion, by 1966 “there ha[d] been substantial
progress, and the years since 1961 have seen a marked increase in the extent to which
analysis of policy and strategy have influenced decisionmakers on the broadest issues of
national defense.” 16 President Lyndon B. Johnson would expand the reach of systems
analysis even further, announcing in a statement to members of his cabinet and heads of
federal executive agencies on August 25, 1965, that he had directed his budget director,
Charles Schultze, to implement the new PPBS method throughout all federal agencies.
Johnson emphasized that the new method would “identify national goals with precision
and on a continuing basis,” help “search for alternative means of reaching those goals
most effectively at the least cost,” and accurately “measure the performance of programs

14

Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2.
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 28.
16
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2.
15
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to insure a dollars worth of service for each dollar spent.” 17 Through a further series of
executive orders, Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton would
eventually expand the use of systems analysis, requiring all executive agencies to make
economic impact studies of all major government regulations. 18
This expansion of systems analysis to all governmental decision-making was
significant—or, in Edward Quade’s words, “possibly even more radical” than the earlier
development of operations research. 19 It carried the possibility of major repercussions. As
Quade explained, alternative policies are not always “obvious substitutes for one
another,” nor do they always “perform the same specific function.” 20 Nevertheless, he
observed, “education, antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum clearance may
all be alternatives in combating juvenile delinquency.” 21 Any one of them could be called
for by PPBS analysis. Moreover, systems analysis could give us the tools to decide
whether, as Quade noted, “additional money might be better spent on space exploration
or economic opportunity programs”; 22 or whether to “reduce unemployment to less than
2% in two years or add a certain number of miles to the interstate highway system.” 23 In
effect, according to its proponents, systems analysis would allow policy-makers to put
aside partisan politics, personal preferences, subjective values, and overinflated
expectations. As a colleague at RAND and later Secretary of Defense, James R.
Schlesinger, would explain: “[Systems analysis] eliminates the purely subjective
approach on the part of devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of
argument. They must talk about reality rather than morality.” 24 With systems analysis,
Schlesinger argued, there was no longer any need for political wrangling, for value
judgments, nor for practical experience—in effect, no need for Aristotelian virtues such
as phronesis, nor for Machiavellian notions of virtù. The right answer emerged from the
machine-model that evaluates cost and effectiveness; all that was needed was a narrow
and precise objective.
C. The Influence of Systems Analysis on the Study of Public Policy
It is fair to say that, today, the method of systems analysis has entered the
mainstream of public policy analysis, has been generalized, and has become somewhat
second-nature. What was once technical systems analysis has become, today, the
17

United States General Accounting Office, Survey of progress in implementing the planningprogramming-budgeting system in executive agencies; report to the Congress, Washington, DC. 1969, p. 4.
18
See President Carter’s executive order E.O. 12044 (tasking all executive agencies with the duty to
conduct economic impact studies of all major government regulations); President Reagan’s executive order
E.O. 12291 (assigning the responsibility to the Office of Management and Budget); President Bill Clinton’s
executive order E.O. 12866 (on the “Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations” (1996)).
19
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2.
20
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 7.
21
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 7.
22
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 18.
23
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, pp. 4-5.
24
James R. Schlesinger, “Quantitative Analysis and National Security,” World Politics, XV(2) (1963), p.
1963.
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canonical approach to public policy. As Edward Rubin observes, “The components of an
optimal public policymaking process are well known and generally agreed upon” 25: they
include, first, selecting a problem, second, finding the range of alternative policies, third
assessing each one, and fourth, ranking them—or, in Rubin’s own words:
First, the decision maker should define the problem to be solved. The next step is
to generate a range of possible alternatives that might potentially resolve the
problem. Each alternative is then assessed for its potential effectiveness on the
basis of the available information. Then the decision maker chooses the most
promising alternative; the more information and analysis that can be brought to
bear on the decision, the more likely it will be that the most effective alternative
will be selected. Once the choice is made, it must be implemented… 26
This is, of course, a more informal but exact articulation of the RAND model.
And it is generally considered the “optimal” public policymaking process, according to
leading public policy figures, including Eugene Bardach, Thomas Birkland, John
Friedman, Lewis Zekhauser, and Deborah Stone. 27 As Rubin emphasizes, it is “the
decision making sequence that is widely recognized in our society as the most promising
way to make public policy.” 28
Stone and Zekhauser set forth the sequence as follows in their canonical text on
public policy analysis, A Primer for Policy Analysis: 29
1. Establishing the Context. What is the underlying problem that must be dealt
with? What specific objectives are to be pursued in confronting this problem?
2. Laying Out the Alternatives. What are the alternative courses of action? What
are the possibilities for gathering further information?
3. Predicting the Consequences. What are the consequences of each of the
alternative actions? What techniques are relevant for predicting these
consequences? If outcomes are uncertain, what is the estimated likelihood of
each?
4. Valuing the Outcomes. By what criteria should we measure success in
pursuing each objective? Recognizing that inevitably some alternatives will be
25

Edward L. Rubin, “Public Policy and the Methodology of Statutory Design,” work-in-progress draft
dated September 9, 2013, presented at the Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop at Columbia
Law School on Monday, September 30, 2013, draft p. 38.
26
Rubin, 2013, p. 38. Rubin fleshes out this schema in step-by-step detail on pages 49 through 60 of his
draft. More simply, though, he writes: the public policy approach “define[s] the problem, generate[s]
alternatives, evaluate[s] at least the most promising alternatives, and reach[es] a decision on the basis of
that evaluation.” Id., at p. 39.
27
See Rubin, 2013, p. 38 n. 151.
28
Rubin, 2013, p. 40.
29
Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (New York: Norton & Co., 1978).
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superior with respect to certain objectives and inferior with respect to others,
how should different combinations of valued objectives be compared with one
another?
5. Making a Choice. Drawing all aspects of the analysis together, what is the
preferred course of action? 30
Underlying this approach and its generalization, there is an idea that in practically
all domains there is a policy space within which it is possible to use this policy method to
achieve better results, to be more effective, to get it right—or, in Rubin’s words, to “do a
better job in that inevitable social engineering in which we engage in all the time.”31
What the policy approach does is to try to magnify the policy space in order to
incrementally improve decision-making—in the very same way in which systems
analysis tried to extend its reach from the narrow confines of military operations research
to the entire administrative state. As Rubin writes: “the more information and analysis
that can be brought to bear on the decision, the more likely it will be that the most
effective alternative will be selected.” 32 What is clear is that systems analytic approaches
have shaped the contemporary study of public policy. They would also shape the study of
crime and punishment.
II. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
During the Progressive Era, reformers had already gravitated toward the notion of
systems, especially with regard to the treatment of juvenile offenders. One of the first
uses of the term “criminal justice system” occurred in a 1939 report on Youth in the Toils,
a study conducted on behalf of The Delinquency Committee of the New York City Boys
Bureau, an organization that addressed the problems of homeless youth. In the
immediately following years, the expression “criminal justice system” would be used in
several other publications, each time to refer again to the issue of juvenile delinquency.
The expression was used, for instance, in a 1941 issue of Federal Probation, 33 a 1942
issue of the American Bar Association Journal titled “The Criminal Youth Problem,”34
and a 1942 article in Law and Contemporary Problems, “Existing Provisions for the
Correction of Youthful Offenders.” 35

30

Stockey and Zeckhauser, 1978, pp. 5-6.
Rubin comments at Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop, September 30, 2013.
32
Rubin, p. 38.
33
John R. Ellingston, “Protecting Our Children from Criminal Careers,” Federal Probation, Vol. 5(4):62,
1940.
34
Orrie L. Phillips, “The Criminal Youth Problem,” American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 28(9):582,
1942.
35
Austin H. MacCormick, “Existing Provisions for the Correction of Youthful Offenders,” Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 9(4):597, 1942.
31
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But these loose references to a criminal justice system would gain new analytic
power with the emergence of systems analysis, such that, by the second half of the
twentieth century, the field of criminal justice began to be understood as a relatively
enclosed system in which particular sets of actors (policemen, prosecutors, judges,
probation officers, correctional guards, wardens, parole board members, etc.) operate a
defined set of institutions (police, courts, jails, prisons, parole supervision, etc.) to
promote a distinct set of systems objectives (crime control, population management,
service needs, etc.) and to produce a functioning structure of criminal justice.
Systems analysis played an important role in crystalizing the notion of a “criminal
justice system.” A genealogic link can be traced at both the individual and institutional
levels. Alfred Blumstein, for instance, a towering figure in American criminology,
himself began as an operations researcher and was president of the Operations Research
Society of America (ORSA)—and tellingly, his appointment at Carnegie Mellon is as
University Professor of Urban Systems and Operations Research.
In a fascinating memoire titled “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal
Justice System,” 36 Blumstein refers to himself as an “OR Missionary” and traces his
missionary activities in the area of criminal justice. Reflecting back on his trajectory,
Blumstein would write that “the missionary function was an important role of OR, and so
I encouraged OR folks to look to missionary opportunities. That was well before I
immersed myself fully in missionary activity with the criminal justice system.” 37
Blumstein viewed his “missionary role,” in his own words, as “bringing OR perspectives
to the ‘heathens’ in a particular domain—those who have not yet adopted quantification,
modeling, system perspectives, and planning that characterize the hallmark of OR.” 38
Blumstein was not alone. As he observed, “there have been many other OR
people, particularly Arnold Barnett, Jon Caulkins, Jan Chaiken, Peter Greenwood,
Richard Larson, and Michael Maltz, who have had their own experiences with the CJS
[criminal justice system], and many of them have received honors from the OR
community as well as the CJS community.” 39 A lengthy and useful review of OR
contributions to the criminal justice system is provided in Michael Maltz’s 1994 chapter
on “Operations research in studying crime and justice: Its history and
accomplishments.” 40

36

Alfred Blumstein, “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal Justice System,” Operations Research,
55(1):14-23 (2007).
37
Blumstein, “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal Justice System,” 2007, p. 14.
38
Blumstein, 2007, p. 14.
39
Blumstein, 2007, p. 22.
40
Michael Maltz, “Operations research in studying crime and justice: Its history and accomplishments,” in
Stephen Pollock, Michael Rothkopf, Arnold Barnett, eds. Operations Research in the Public Sector, Vol. 6.
Handbooks in Operations Research and the Management Sciences. North-Holland, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands (1994).
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But one could also trace an institutional genealogy and locate it right here in New
York City during the 1970s.
A. The New York City RAND Institute
John Lindsay was elected mayor of New York City in 1966 and took office
promising to reform city government with more efficient cost-benefit budgeting—
specifically, with Planning-Programming-Budgeting System analysis. Mayor Lindsay
intended to bring the new PPBS technique to New York City “to improve budgeting and
operations.” 41
At the time, violent crime in the City was on the rise. 42 The crime problem was
particularly acute in public housing projects and so-called “welfare hotels.” 43 Mayor
Lindsay invited the RAND Corporation to develop new strategies to reduce and prevent
crime; and within a few years, Lindsay had helped establish the New York City RAND
Institute as a joint project of the City and RAND Corporation. 44
In January 1968, Mayor Lindsay hailed New York City’s new arrangement with
the RAND Corporation to tackle crime prevention in the City:
This agreement will greatly assist our introduction into city
agencies of the kind of streamlined, modern management
thinking that Robert McNamara applied in the Pentagon
with such success during the past seven years. ... I regard
this as the most important development in the search for effectiveness in city government in many, many years. 45
With crime on the rise, the primary focus of the RAND satellite would be the
New York City Police Department. At a news conference on January 8, 1969, Mayor
Lindsay and Henry Rowen, the president of RAND and previously Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense under McNamara, unveiled the new project with great fanfare: an
41
Jennifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War
America. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) at p. 67. For an excellent history of the
emergence of these techniques and rationalities, see S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy:
The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
42
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initial contract with the City worth $607,000, a Madison Avenue office “staffed by 40
economists, sociologists, engineers, cost analysts and other researchers,” and four focus
areas, the most important of which would be the NYPD (the other three being the fire
department, housing administration, and health services). 46 Everyone expected a tight
collaboration. As the New York Times suggested, “The city’s relationship with RAND
would be similar to the one RAND has had with the Air Force since World War II” 47—
one could hardly imagine a tighter relationship than that.
Once established, the New York City RAND Institute immediately began to
tackle the crime problem with a number of reports and recommendations about how to
improve the efficiency of police services. The first series of reports were extremely
narrow operations research-type reports, with titles such as “A Hypercube Queueing
Model for Facility Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services” (Richard C.
Larson, R-1238-HUD, 1973), “Response of Emergency Units: The Effects of Barriers,
Discrete Streets, and One-Way Streets” (Richard C. Larson, R-675-HUD, 1971),
“Allocation of Emergency Units Response Areas” (Jan M. Chaiken, P-4745, 1971),
“Analysis of the Night and Weekend Arraignment Parts in the Bronx and Queens
Criminal Courts” (John B. Jennings, R-1236-NYS, 1973), “Using Simulation To Develop
and Validate Analytical Emergency Service Deployment Models” (Edward Ignall, Peter
Kolesar, and Warren Walker, P-5463, 1975), and “Determining the Travel Characteristics
of Emergency Service Vehicles” (J. Hausner, R-1687-HUD, 1975). These studies applied
complex mathematical models to examine minute dispatching and routing efficiencies.
They resembled the classic early applications of operations research outside the military
to matters such as determining “how Post Office pick-up trucks should be routed to
collect mail from deposit boxes, or whether computers should be rented or purchased, or
what type of all-weather landing system should be installed in new commercial
aircraft.” 48
Gradually and interspersed in these operation research-type reports, there emerged
a number of systems analysis-type studies. The contours of the approach were captured
well by the New York Times in 1968 when it defined it as the “method of analyzing a
problem by listing the desired objectives and available resources and then detailing alternative methods of using the resources to accomplish the objectives.” 49 RAND’s
systems analytic studies did indeed focus on a narrow objective—preventing crime—and
they would embrace a wide range of different alternative policies to try to determine the
most efficient. And so, within a few years, with crime on the rise and a ready method at
hand, RAND and the NYC RAND Institute were deeply involved in problem-solving
crime in public housing using a systems analysis approach.
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B. Liechenstein’s 1971 RAND Report
An illustrative study was Michael I. Liechenstein’s report issued in June 1971,
which addressed the objective of, as the title suggests, “Reducing Crime in Apartment
Dwellings: A Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives.” 50 The study, which
was sponsored by Mayor Lindsay’s Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, analyzed
techniques for improving security in New York City Housing Authority buildings. It took
a “broad operational view of a security system,” 51 analyzing fifteen alternative policies,
including tenant training and education, tenant patrols, tenant qualifications to live in the
projects, extended recreational opportunities for teenagers, rent rebates, elaborate
building-entry restrictions, locked lobbies, intrusion detectors, weapon detectors,
surveillance, and increased police or guard manning.
In order to compare the alternatives, the study developed “effectiveness criteria”
and then coupled those to “compatibility and cost criteria to derive estimates of an overall
figure of merit (e.g., the ration of effectiveness-to-cost with a constraint on either
minimum effectiveness or maximum cost).” 52 In addition to the security effectiveness
and compatibility criteria, the report also listed cost-benefit criteria: “Research and
development cost (equipment, maintenance, administration before production); Capital
cost (equipment, maintenance, and administrative costs during production); Operating
cost (equipment, maintenance, administration costs during use); Scrap value (residual
value at end of use); Expected total benefit.” 53
The report generated a graph of the cost-effectiveness of all fifteen alternatives:
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The fifteen different measures ranged the political spectrum—from education for
low-income project tenants on issues of criminal offending, preventive measures, and
self-defense, to providing recreational facilities for poor urban teenagers, to offering
subsidies and other positive financial incentives to poor tenants, to raising admissibility
and tenure standards for housing assistance, to increasing police presence. They included
everything from education, to recreation, to target-hardening, to policing. Based on the
quantitative analysis, the report concluded that the most cost-effective preventive
measure was an increased police force and more guard-manning.
This was, one could say, the pinnacle of systems analytics in relation to the
criminal justice system. For RAND, the “criminal justice system” was a natural space for
systems analytics. To be sure, part of the attraction of systems analysis talk at an
institution like the New York City RAND Institute was an artifact of the consultancy
business; and the NYC RAND Institute in fact folded in 1975 amidst significant—I might
add, ironic—controversy over Lindsay’s profligate spending on consultants. 54 But
nevertheless, the notion of “the criminal justice system” would stick and the systems
analytic approach would become increasingly important. It would lead to a whole set of
institutions and think tanks, across the political spectrum, that would take as its object the
54
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criminal justice system—such as the Vera Institute of Justice, the Urban Institute, the
Institute for Law and Justice, the Police Foundation, the Police Executive Research
Forum, to name a few. These organizations would centrally embrace the notion of
“systems.” The Vera Institute’s very logo is “Making justice systems fairer and more
effective through research and innovation.” 55 And systems analytic types of methods and
reasoning would continue to develop, including importantly in cases like the
COMPSTAT approach in New York City.
Today, the idea that there is a “criminal justice system” has become so dominant
that practically everyone thinks about crime and punishment through a systems analytic
lens and uses the language and logic of systems in a natural and reflexive way. We are so
deeply entrenched in this view of criminal justice that it is practically redundant to
observe that we conceive of the area in terms of a system. It is practically impossible
today to work or speak in the area without referring to it as the “criminal justice system.”
The systems approach that crystalized in the 1960s dominates our way of thinking about
the field today.
C. CJS-Systems Analysis in Context
Systems analytic reasoning in the area of criminal justice fits within a family of
consequentialist justifications, insofar as it focuses on affecting an outcome (for example,
crime reduction, efficient population management, etc.) It may be important to
distinguish between different approaches here that bear family resemblances:
1. Behavioral prevention theory, namely the idea that the goal of the criminal
sanction is to reform the individual so that he is no longer dangerous
(rehabilitation) and to protect the society by a mixture of incapacitation and
treatment of the offender.
2. Utilitarian deterrence theory, namely the idea that the goal of the criminal
sanction is to deter the individual offender (specific deterrence) and to deter
other potential offenders through the sanction.
3. Crime control systems analysis, namely the idea that the goal of the criminal
sanction is to reduce crime using the most cost-effective means.
Each of these is outcome oriented in the sense that they each are intended to
maximize or at least promote a social good—by contrast, say, to a retributive theory that
seeks only to punish someone as a just desert for a wicked act. In this sense, they are all
sub-types of utilitarianism. But the third, systems analysis, is more capacious and less
means driven, less wedded to any particular mechanism (particular treatments or forms of
deterrence). Systems analysis, in a sense, is the umbrella theory under which both
behavioral and traditional deterrence policies could be implemented. From a systems
55
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analysis perspective, both the behavioral and deterrence theories jump the gun: for a
systems analyst, the question is to figure out which treatment is the most cost-effective.
Now, the systems analytic approach could be called, broadly speaking,
“utilitarian” in the sense that it is effectively trying to maximize a welfare outcome. But I
think it would be fairer to say, instead, that systems analysis is a subset of a utilitarian
framework, since the systems analysis approach does not set, as its objective, to
maximize social welfare, but rather to most efficiently achieve the objectives associated
with a system. It does not weigh that or those objectives against other social desiderata. It
does not concern itself with the question how crime reduction, say, compares to cancer
research, to highway construction, etc., so long as the latter are not policy alternatives
that are being considered and compared in the analysis. Systems analysis, in effect,
shoots for a partial equilibrium limited to the specific objective that is identified. It does
so using a utilitarian logic, but does not reach the level of a general welfare calculus.
In other words, systems analytic approaches are agnostic as to the preferable
method or technique of punishment ex ante. But they are not agnostic to the type of good,
the specific utility, that they pursue. They are not reducible to a general welfare function.
In this sense, they target a particular policy space. And they can lead to utilitarian
methods of deterrence, to behavioral instruments of incapacitation, or to rehabilitation.
All that matters is that the methods chosen and the outcome—the highest ranked of “The
Promising ALTERNATIVES”—are implemented.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The influence of systems analysis in the field of law, writ large, is a complicated
matter that would require lengthy treatment and would lead us astray from the focus of
this article—namely, criminal law and criminal procedure. At the broadest level, the idea
that the field of law could be usefully understood through the lens of a “legal system”
percolated through Anglo-American legal thought for centuries. 56 The use of biological
systems metaphors was prominent in the nineteenth century on the Continent. 57 And in
56
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the twentieth century, the metaphor of systems continued to play an important role in
legal thought, as reflected in the writings of Niklas Luhmann and the emergence of
autopoesis theory, 58 which drew in large part on Parsonian systems analysis. 59
Rottleuthner 1987, 103). Jhering spoke of “the legal institutions as ‘the skeleton of the law’ (1852: 36), or
[referred to] the heart, blood, arteries or pulse of the legal organism (1853: 44)” (Rottleuthner 1987, 103).
(Rottleuthner notes that van Krieken, in 1873, traced the origin of the metaphor in its current usage to
Schelling and Fichte).
58
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calls the “closed” and “open” aspects of the legal system. The legal system is ‘normatively’ closed, but
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In the specific legal field of criminal law and criminal procedure, however,
systems analysis would have a distinct influence because of its direct link to the “criminal
justice system.” Just as systems analysis began to crystalize the notion of a “criminal
justice system,” a distinct style of judicial decision-making and legal reasoning based on
a systems analytic approach would emerge and begin to encroach upon an earlier way of
thinking about punishment as a question of sovereign right.
Here too, one could trace a genealogy that would link particular individuals and
institutions. The former dean at Harvard Law School, James Vorenberg, who was a
formidable figure in criminal law and procedure, worked closely with Alfred
Blumstein—respectively, as Executive Director and as Director of Science and
Technology of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice—to introduce systems analysis into criminal law reform. 60 The
1967 President’s Commission conducted a broad-ranging analysis of the state of the
American criminal justice system, 61 and its final report, “The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society,” represented an early model of the application of OR to criminal justice.
One of the Commission report’s main accomplishments was precisely to establish “a
‘systems point of view’ as a basic frame of reference, and a better understanding of the
‘hydraulic’ nature of that system.” 62
As Charles F. Wellford suggests, Vorenberg undoubtedly was a large influence on
the Commission’s decision to implement systems analysis, as was “the decision of the
Attorney General and Secretary of Defense to allow the Institute for Defense Analysis,
and in particular Alfred Blumstein, to be a part of the President’s Commission.” 63 Also
important was Harvard Professor Lloyd Ohlin, who had applied systems thought to the
American Bar Foundation criminal justice surveys of the 1950s and to much of his work
on juvenile justice, prediction, and corrections. 64
Thus the structural-functionalist does not seek to analyze individual goals, but broad patterns of goals of
multiple individuals.
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In large part, the systems approach was introduced in the 1967 President’s
Commission as an alternative to experimentation. 65 As Wellford documents, “Vorenberg,
Ohlin, Blumstein, and others emphasized the role of [systems] research” because
“experimentation is frequently impossible” in the criminal justice arena. Wellford
continues:
“So the creation of a model of the system, one that could be manipulated to
determine effects, would be a critical first step in understanding how
improvements could be achieved. The flow chart was a first step in identifying the
components of the system which could be manipulated to determine their effect
on the remainder of the system. From this goal of improvement, and in
recognition of the difficulty of the experimentation, the Commission moved to
introduce not only a concept of criminal justice, but a methodology of system
analysis including mathematical modeling as a way to identify and evaluate
effective changes.” 66
The 1967 President’s Commission is a landmark for locating criminal justice
within a “system” and for making recommendations based on the functions and
objectives of the system. Systems analysis features prominently in the law reform project
in two central respects: first, systems analysis is the method by which the criminal justice
system, as a “system,” is analyzed and upon which the recommendations are based. The
Commission outlines, using as a visual aid complex flow-charts that recall early RAND
reports, the entirety of the criminal justice system, the modus operandi of its individual
subparts, the relative success of each part’s performance, its personnel and resource
allocation, and recommendations for how institutional practices, resources and personnel
might be altered to increase success. Second, as part of these recommendations, the
Commission calls for the future implementation of systems analysis at the local level—
the level of the subpart—in order to assess future functional needs. Vorenberg,
Blumstein, Ohlin, and their colleagues used systems analysis in order to diagnose
systemic problems of the criminal justice system, and subsequently recommended that
more such analysis be applied in order to continue the practice of diagnosis and the
specific kinds of prescription it tends to generate.
Dean Vorenberg also headed up, with his colleague Paul Bator, a distinguished
study group of the American Law Institute on criminal justice. 67 That commission was
the first survey of its kind in the United States, and it sought to map out the various levels
Correctional Change,” The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 45 (4), 1954: p.
402; Lloyd Ohlin, “Validation and Control of Parole Prediction,” The Midwest Sociologist 12 (1), 1949: p.
9; Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs
(Free Press, 1966).
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of the American criminal justice system (and “non-system,” as its authors sometimes
termed it). 68
There were, of course, others with OR backgrounds. Associate Justice John M.
Harlan II, who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1955 and would influence much of
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, had “headed up the Eighth Air
Force Operations Analysis Section (OAS)” during World War II as part of an effort to
introduce OR into U.S. Air Force tactics. 69 Nicholas Katzenbach, who served as Attorney
General during President Lyndon Johnson’s administration, headed the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Kennedy administration, and taught law at Yale and then Chicago, 70 also
had an OR background and would serve as chair of the report of the 1967 President’s
Commission.71
Although it would be possible to dig deeper into these personal and institutional
genealogies, the influence of systems analysis on criminal law and procedure was
probably more indirect: Systems analysis was in the air in the 1960s and it was having a
direct influence on criminology and the study of the “criminal justice system.” At exactly
the same time, there began to be a distinct style of judicial decision-making that rested on
a systems analytic approach. This style of reasoning would take two distinct forms.
A. The Internal Approach: Models of the Criminal Justice System
In one form, the judicial decision-maker or legal scholar considers criminal law
and procedure adjudication to be part of the “criminal justice system” and attempts to
maximize the objectives of the system.
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a. Herbert Packer’s “Models” of the Criminal Process
Herbert Packer would lead the way in identifying this style of reasoning by
describing, in one of the most celebrated (at the time and still today, for many) theoretical
interventions, two dominant “models” of constitutional criminal procedure. First
presented in his article “Two Models of the Criminal Process,” 72 published in 1964, and
then further developed in his book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 73 published in
1968, Packer described two competing models of judicial reasoning in criminal law and
procedure: a crime control model, oriented toward the goal of reducing crime, and a due
process model, oriented toward the goal of protecting individual rights.
Although Packer did not explicitly use the term “systems analysis,” the models
that he identified were unquestionably systems analytic. In his own language and analysis
of the crime-control model, for instance, Packer would expressly deploy systems
discourse. He wrote, for instance, that “By ‘efficiency’ we mean the system’s capacity to
apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose
offenses become known.” 74 Modeling itself, from Packer’s perspective, was a form of
systems thought. As he wrote:
We need to detach ourselves from the welter of more or less connected details that
make up an accurate description of the myriad ways in which the criminal process
does operate or may be likely to operate in midtwentieth-century America so that
we can begin to appraise the system as a whole in terms of its capacity to deal
with the variety of substantive missions we confide to it. 75
In this sense, Packer’s Limits of the Criminal Sanction proceeds from a systems
analytic framework. The project starts by identifying a social problem. In fact, the very
first paragraph of the book opens with an articulation, clarification, and identification of
the “social problem” that the book addresses: “the problem of trying to control anti-social
behavior by imposing punishment on people found guilty of violating rules of conduct
called criminal statutes.” 76 With that social problem in mind, Packer then turns to a form
of modeling. Simple modeling, no equations, but modeling nonetheless. The idea is to
“begin to see how the system as a whole might be able to deal with the variety of
missions we confide to it” and, for this, the approach he takes is “to abstract from reality,
to build a model.”77 Packer in fact builds two models, which represent, he suggests, the
two poles or extreme points of the “two value systems that compete for priority in the

72
Packer, Herbert, “Two Models of the Criminal Process,” 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1,
1964.
73
Packer, Herbert, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.
74
Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 158 (emphasis added).
75
Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 152 (emphasis added).
76
Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 3.
77
Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 152.

22

operation of the criminal process.” 78 Packer presents his models as “an attempt to give
operational content to a complex of values underlying the criminal law.” 79
The crime control model, Packer explains, “is based on the proposition that the
repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by
the criminal process.” 80 In other words, the system objective is crime reduction. This
clearly represents a systems analysis of criminal law and procedure that has as its
objective crime reduction. The actors in the models include “lawmakers, judges, police,
prosecutors, defense lawyers.” 81 And the model rests on an efficiency analysis: “the
Crime Control Model requires that primary attention be paid to the efficiency with which
the criminal process operates to screen suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate
dispositions of persons convicted of crime.” 82 The criterion of efficiency has to do with
the ability of the process to catch and convict large numbers of offenders.
For this, Packer notes, “There must then be a premium on speed and finality.
Speed, in turn, depends on informality and on uniformity; finality depends on minimizing
the occasions for challenge.” 83 Packer explains:
The image that comes to mind is an assembly-line conveyor belt down which
moves an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers
who stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the same
small but essential operation that brings it one step closer to being a finished
product, or, to exchange the metaphor for the reality, a closed file. 84
The applications of the crime control model that Packer discusses make clear that
this is systems analysis. So, for instance, in discussing the question of police misconduct
attendant to arrests, Packer rehearses the systems analytic approach. Packer collects and
evaluates the most promising alternatives and essentially ranks them ordinally: the “most
appropriate” policy ends up being discipline of the offending officer; the second
alternative is civil remedies against the police officer; and the bottom (in this case,
unacceptable) alternative is suppression of the evidence or dismissal of the case. 85 Packer
applies the same kind of analysis, under the crime control model, to issues ranging from
investigatory stops under the Terry stop-and-frisk rule 86; the length of detention and
interrogation prior to consulting an attorney or notifying family87; how coercive
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interrogations may be 88; the Miranda rule 89; electronic surveillance 90; and all the steps
between charging decisions and pre-trial detention to the determination of guilt, to
appeals and post-conviction review.
By contrast to this first model, the due process model that Packer develops is
oriented toward a cluster of liberal legal objectives. “Its ideology,” Packer tells us, “is
composed of a complex of ideas, some of them based on judgments about the efficacy of
crime control devices, others having to do with quite different considerations.” 91 Some of
these quite different considerations include the importance of factual accuracy, the value
of equality (even for indigent defendants), and a certain skepticism regarding the morality
and the utility of punishment. The result is a very different model: “The Due Process
Model resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input to quality
control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output.” 92
Whether the due process model is, strictly speaking, a “model” by systems
analysis standards is perhaps debatable, in large part because the objectives are so much
less quantifiable. Even Packer draws an important distinction between the positive or
what he calls “affirmative” nature of the crime control model and the “negative model” of
due process. 93 This distinction between positive and negative is important because
systems analysis is, by definition, oriented to a positive objective. We could imagine that
we have here, sensu stricto, one systems analysis approach (which explains why Packer
also views the crime-control model as ultimately resting on administrative and legislative
authority) versus a more legalistic approach that is based on judicial oversight (and here,
Packer also places this second model under the authority of judicial power). 94
But this is all quibbling at the edges. The crime control model is squarely systems
analytic, and ultimately Packer himself adopts a crime-control systems analytic view—or
what he calls an “Integrated Theory of Criminal Punishment” that includes two maxims,
the first of which is that “It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment that
it is designed to prevent the commission of offenses.” 95 Packer also includes a
blameworthiness condition in order to prevent the punishment of innocent people or
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unjust punishment 96; the notion of culpability is, in his words, a “limiting principle, not a
justification for action.” 97
As Packer states, the goal should be crime reduction: he adopts as his “rationale”
for the criminal sanction—i.e., as his objective and guiding principle—“one that pursues
the central goal of prevention of socially undesirable behavior, as limited by restrictions
of culpability.” 98 In the third portion of the book, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,
which consists of material that was not included in the original article on “Two Models of
the Criminal Process,” Packer emphasizes that:
The function of the criminal sanction is to help prevent or reduce socially
undesirable conduct through the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and
punishment of offenders. This is the only function that its rationale permits and
this is the only function with which its processes are adequately equipped to
deal. 99
This is, in the end, a systems analytic approach. 100 And it was received as such.
Packer’s admirers and detractors recognized the systematic and analytic dimensions of
his intervention. 101 And note, of course, that the timing is perfect: Packer develops his
models at the height of systems analytic thinking, in the mid-1960s, when McNamara
was using PPBS at the Pentagon and President Johnson was imposing the method on the
full federal government.
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The same would be true for the leading critic of Packer’s models, John Griffiths,
who published in the Yale Law Journal in 1970 an article entitled “Ideology in Criminal
Procedure or A Third ‘Model’ of the Criminal Process.” 102 Griffiths’ argument was that
Packer’s two models were actually both part of a single “battle model” of criminal
procedure, and he proposed, for argument’s sake, a different model of the criminal
process, what he called the “Family Model.” But even Griffiths’s alternative model can
be interpreted through systems analytics: namely, as pursuing a family-oriented objective
within a systems theory.
Griffiths argued that Packer’s Due Process Model rested on the same assumptions
about the function of the criminal law system. Packer’s description of the Due Process
Model as undermining the efficiency of the process—of being simply inefficient—
reflects the unidimensionality of the analysis, Griffiths argued: due process protections
“can only be deemed simply ‘inefficient’ if the values they serve are not included among
the substantive goals of the criminal process.” 103 As a result, Griffiths argues, Packer’s
two models were nothing more than two versions of a common “Battle Model”:
In the service of this fundamental dogma, Packer consistently portrays the
criminal process as a struggle—a stylized war—between two contending forces
whose interests are implacably hostile: the Individual (particularly, the accused
individual) and the State. His two Models are nothing more than alternative
derivations from that conception of profound and irreconcilable disharmony of
interest. Since the metaphor of battle roughly suits this silent premise about the
nature of the relationship of state and individual reflected in the criminal process,
I shall use it to characterize Packer’s position: the Battle Model of the criminal
process. 104
Griffiths developed, in his article, an alternative model to the Battle Model,
which he called the Family Model—not one, he writes, that he necessarily espoused, but
that he offered by way of illustration. That family model assumed, as its premise, that the
interests of the various parties are reconcilable and it took, as its concern, “what,
speaking broadly, is ‘good for’ a defendant caught up in the criminal process.” 105 The
central function of the criminal process, from this perspective, is to improve the overall
health of the social unit that is represented by the family. As Griffiths wrote, “it is central
to the Family Model that the function of the process involves far more than suppressing
certain offenses.” 106 Instead, along this dimension, the educational function would be one
of the more important: “One particularly important substantive function with reference to
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which any institution can be designed is its educational impact upon those exposed to
it.” 107
It would be possible to think of Griffiths’s model along systems analytic terms:
the objective would be the health of the social unit, the family, and various different
forms of punishment and process could be evaluated with that criterion in mind. Griffiths
had, however, a particular view about the use of the term “model” that I do not agree
with. Griffiths argued that the term “model” merely stood for a “perspective” or an
“interpretation” of the criminal process. 108 Griffiths rejected the idea that these are, really,
models, and argued that Packer himself could not believe “that writ large either would be
a functioning system of criminal procedure.” 109 I think that is entirely wrong, and that we
are in fact dealing—surely with the Crime Control Model, possibly with the Due Process
Model, and, ironically, with Griffiths’s Family Model—with models that should be
understood as systems analytic methods. 110
b.

Supreme Court Adjudication

In contrast to Packer’s stylized crime control model which utilizes a systems
analytic method in the strict sense—comparing alternatives, ranking them, and endorsing
the most efficient mechanisms for crime control—judicial decision-making that adopts
systems analytics tends to do so more informally. The act of adjudication—especially the
way in which issues make their way to the courts and the types of decisions that courts
are generally asked to perform (i.e. whether a promising alternative is constitutional or
not)—puts a certain limit on a judge’s ability to engage in full-blown systems analysis.
As a result, judges who embrace a systems analytic approach tend to focus on the
later stages of system analysis: they will articulate, first, one or more overarching
objectives for the criminal justice system—such as, for instance, crime control, security
management, or the proper and efficient functioning of the criminal justice system—but
then fast forward to the final columns of the analysis and declare that the particular legal
practice at issue is the most efficient or a fully efficient and proper way to satisfy the
system’s objective. The analysis is somewhat truncated. It rarely engages in rigorous
empirical analysis, data collection, modeling, or quantitative analysis. But it functions in
the same way, especially at the tail end, and adopts the language and style of system
analysis.
It is precisely the systems analytic approach that affords this form of judicial
decision-making its neutrality and objectivity. Just as Schlesinger would claim that
systems analysis is objective and eliminates moral or normative considerations, judicial
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reasoning that rests on this approach also claims objectivity and purports to avoid
subjective normative judgments. On this view, a particular practice—such as, for
instance, jury discretion or stop-and-frisk policies—is viewed as either efficient and
necessary to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system or not, but in either
case the determination is presented as an objective fact about the practice that does not
require normative or moral evaluation. The needs of the system do not lend themselves to
subjective assessments or evaluation: the systems analytic approach in adjudication is
about reality, a proponent might say, not about morality.
Several of the landmark Warren Court opinions in criminal procedure reflect this
internal systems analytic approach. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona 111 is an
interesting illustration. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court integrates a systems
analysis, not as to the narrow legal question at issue—namely, whether the Fifth
Amendment applies to custodial interrogation at the police precinct—but as to the
remedy, once the legal issue has been resolved. In other words, once Chief Justice
Warren has made the strictly legal decision at the heart of Miranda—namely, once he
decides to extend the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination from the
courtroom into the police custodial setting 112—he then turns, effectively, to systems
analytic reasoning to determine the remedy. Though he does not, in fact, collect all
possible “promising alternatives,” he does evaluate and endorse, on effectiveness
grounds, the specific framework of Miranda warnings—and then encourages Congress to
do the rest:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their
creative rule-making capacities... We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be
observed. 113
Right here, Chief Justice Warren embeds a partial systems analysis within his
remedial discussion. His discussion sounds in systems analysis: it sets out a clear
objective, and then evaluates different options, keeping the functionality of the system at
the heart of the discussion:
Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated
warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself
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suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A
mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that
end….
Chief Justice Warren then evaluates different promising alternatives as if he is
putting them through a model, trying to decipher their individual attributes, in order to
compare and rank them:
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant
subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the
assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer
present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if
coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The
presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the
prosecution at trial. 114
Notice the systems functionality discourse: Warren’s analysis is aimed at ensuring
that the system functions properly and effectively—and promises to leave it in place
unless and until Congress would provide for, essentially, an equal or higher ranking
“alternative.” In the process, Warren is unquestionably activist in setting out the
necessary pre-interrogation procedures, going so far as to create, out of whole cloth, a
Fifth Amendment right to counsel as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
(and a right to the appointment of Fifth Amendment counsel if indigent).
The subsequent Dickerson litigation, several decades later, would turn precisely
on whether Congress’s response in 1968—18 U.S.C. § 3501—was more effective than
the Miranda warnings. 115 This is, essentially, a systems analysis type of question: to
resolve it, we need to load both the Miranda warnings and the 18 U.S.C. § 3501
procedures into Quade’s model and see whether the latter exceed the level of protection
afforded by the former. Of this, Warren was clear: “unless other fully effective means are
adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the
right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required.” 116
Note that the systems analytic material, in the Miranda decision, does not address
the legal issue at hand—namely the extension of the Fifth Amendment right to police
custody—a legal question that is resolved through a far more extensive, capacious, and
wide-ranging discussion of policing and democracy in the modern era, and that ranges
from Lord Devlin’s writings and English procedure since 1912, to India, Ceylon and
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Scotland, to democratic theory. But it is present at the remedies stage. In that sense, it
could possibly be thought of more in line with operations research than with systems
analysis.
It is interesting to note that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Miranda also has a systems
analytic ring to it. (Recall that Harlan had led the Eighth Air Force Operations Analysis
Section during World War II). Harlan focuses on a detailed comparison of the different
alternatives along policy grounds: “Viewed as a choice based on pure policy, these new
rules prove to be a highly debatable, if not one-sided, appraisal of the competing
interests, imposed over widespread objection, at the very time when judicial restraint is
most called for by the circumstances.” 117 Harlan’s Due Process jurisprudence is, in fact,
guided by a systemic approach: as he writes, the Due Process Clause cases “show that
there exists a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial
manner” and they reveal “the baseline from which the Court now departs and so serve to
measure the actual as opposed to the professed distance it travels.” 118 Harlan challenges
the majority in Miranda not only on legal, but on policy grounds, in what sounds very
much like systems discourse. 119
As Daniel Richman suggests, the Warren Court’s incorporation doctrine and
expanded habeas corpus review, in and of itself, practically demanded a systems analytic
approach: by placing itself over an entirely decentralized criminal justice universe—one
that extended into the deepest reaches of local and municipal practices, such as local
bailbondsmen and sheriffs—the Court practically had to use systems functionality
discourse as a necessary heuristic device. One could argue that it was practically
inevitable that the Court would think in systems terms once it had to wrap its hands
around such a localized criminal justice world.
More recent canonical Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law and procedure
area reveal perhaps even more systems analytic reasoning on the core constitutional
issues at stake. Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is a
good illustration. 120 Justice Powell adopts a systems perspective when he analyzes the
role of discretion (prosecutorial, judicial, jury, and other) in the functioning of the
criminal justice system—as a counterweight to the legal challenge involving racial
discrimination. The opinion is written in a way that includes the judiciary, the jury, the
attorneys, etc., as part of the system, and in this sense, represents an instance of the
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internal style of systems analytic decision-making. For Justice Powell, the legal claim
itself is a challenge addressed to the very functioning of the criminal justice system:
McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system.
“[O]ne of society’s most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens
and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through criminal
laws against murder.” Gregg v. Georgia (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring).
Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments.
Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused. 121
Notice how the system’s needs become necessities and how the functioning of the
criminal justice system naturally heightens the legal burden imposed on the petitioner
McCleskey. The result is that the system’s needs are privileged. In rejecting McCleskey’s
challenge, Powell emphasizes that “McCleskey’s argument that the Constitution
condemns the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital sentencing
system is antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal justice
system.” 122
The analysis is framed in terms of system requirements and system functionality,
and so, Powell concludes: “Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light
of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value
of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to
criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process.” 123 From this particular systems analytic perspective, the risk of harm associated
with racial prejudice does not undermine the value of discretion to the overall system:
“Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice
system,” 124 Powell observes. Powell’s opinion in McCleskey is really an idealtype of a
decision that takes a systems analytic approach to the criminal justice system. Ultimately,
the question ends up revolving centrally around the system’s need for discretion.
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the principle of finality in the habeas
corpus context is another good example. The argument for foreclosing consideration of
certain issues past a certain point in time (for instance, once the petitioner has entered
collateral review) rests predominantly on the argument that there are certain things the
criminal justice system needs in order to function properly—and one of those is finality.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Teague v. Lane, for instance, can serve as an
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illustration. 125 The question there was whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to the
benefit of a new legal rule (in that case, whether the Sixth Amendment fair cross section
requirement would apply to a petit jury) if the rule is announced after the petitioner has
exhausted his direct appeals and while the petitioner is in collateral review. Justice
O’Connor, for the Court, adopted Justice Harlan’s retroactivity standard, which barred
the retroactive effect of new rules to cases pending in collateral review (with two narrow
exceptions).
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning tracks perfectly the systems analytic approach.
Justice O’Connor begins as follows:
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to
the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent effect. 126
Justice O’Connor then reviews the cost-effectiveness of the alternative policy and finds
that it is prohibitive:
The “costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of
constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally far outweigh the benefits of this
application.” Stumes (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). In many ways the
application of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than
the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, cf. Younger v. Harris, for it continually
forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose
trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. … We find
these criticisms to be persuasive, and we now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of
retroactivity for cases on collateral review. 127
This systems analytic approach, interestingly, has also been used in recent
scholarship to defend the principle of finality in cases of purported actual innocence.
William Baude, for instance, argues that if “courts must allow every prisoner to
perpetually pursue claims of innocence, it might push an already overburdened judicial
system to the brink.” 128 Such a right to not be executed if innocent would render the
criminal justice system dysfunctional. Perfect accuracy is not the systems objective,
Baude emphasizes: “perfect accuracy is not the goal of the criminal justice system.”129
Notice how the neutral objectives of the system drive the analysis. 130
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In the death penalty case that I am litigating now, Doyle Lee Hamm v. Richard
Allen, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (Eleventh Circuit, No.
13-14376-P), the central issue is whether the Eleventh Circuit can review the validity of a
prior felony conviction from 1978 that was used as an aggravating circumstance to
enhance Hamm’s sentence to death in 1987. As a pretty straightforward matter, the prior
felony conviction is facially invalid: the plea hearing from 1978 is unconstitutional, on its
face, because the circuit judge in Tennessee in 1978 did not inform Hamm of the
constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, in clear violation of Boykin
v. Alabama. 131 This problem has slowed the case down to a crawl, and Hamm has been
on death row for 26 years in part because of this festering sore—and yet, not a single
judge to date has addressed the merits of the argument or read the short, 2,500-word
transcript of the plea hearing on its merits, because of the federal system’s interest in
finality: the case is a perfect illustration of the situation where the reviewing judges (at
the state and federal, trial and appellate levels) have taken a systems analytic approach
focused on the purported integrity or functionality of the system itself in order to avoid
consideration of the claims on the merits. What the systems analytic approach obviates is
a full consideration of the other values regarding the criminal sanction that circulate in
society. 132
B. The External Approach: Deference to the Criminal Justice System
In another manifestation, the courts view themselves as outside the criminal
justice system and instead resolve cases by deferring to the expertise of core actors within
the system. A recent illustration would be Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
(2011) regarding the constitutionality of strip searches incident to jail detention for minor
arrests. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority, upholding a policy of prophylactic
strip searches, essentially defers to the system’s experts.
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Florence opens on a particularly strong systems
analytic tone. The first two sentences of the opinion read: “Correctional officials have a
legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by
reason of what new detainees may carry on their bodies. Facility personnel, other
inmates, and the new detainee himself or herself may be in danger if these threats are
introduced into the jail population.” 133 Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the closed-nature
of the jail system, 134 and in rejecting the argument for constitutional limits on strip
searches, Justice Kennedy writes that any such limits would vitiate the objectives of the
system: “The laborious administration of prisons would become less effective, and likely
less fair and evenhanded.” 135 Justice Kennedy’s decision is guided by a systems analytic
approach:
“The difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by
the courts…. Maintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the
expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise
reasonable solutions to the problems they face.” 136
Justice Kennedy marshals and quantifies the risks to the jail system, and then
defers to the systems experts: “In addressing this type of constitutional claim courts must
defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial
evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of
jail security.” 137
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Maryland v. King (2013), upholding the use of
DNA evidence against a person charged with sexual assault where the DNA sample had
been taken as a matter of routine booking on another arrest, provides another illustration.
Justice Kennedy opens his legal analysis with the following systems analytics:
the utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is already
undisputed. Since the first use of forensic DNA analysis to catch a rapist and
murderer in England in 1986, law enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts
have acknowledged DNA testing’s “unparalleled ability both to exonerate the
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly
improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices.” 138

133

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1513 (2012).
Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 (2012).
135
Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1521 (2012).
136
Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 (2012).
137
Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1513-14. Note that the policy contradicted the best practices of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, the U. S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Service, and the U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs—agencies that all require reasonable suspicion before strip searching minor
offenders. Query whether the systems analysis was thorough here…
138
Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013).
134

34

Once this systems view is established, it then does a lot of work. Faced with the
Fourth Amendment issue in the case, Justice Kennedy finds that the governmental
interest served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act is a core function of the criminal
justice system—namely, “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate
way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.” 139
It is because of the system’s needs that Kennedy then upholds the DNA sampling. As he
writes, the “context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying
respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so
that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial
custody.” 140 It is also interesting to note that Justice Scalia’s outraged dissent in King
essentially dismantles the system functionality analysis of the DNA sampling for
identification. Justice Scalia takes apart the systems reasoning of the majority decision.
***
These are examples or, better yet, idealtypes of two forms of systems analytic
reasoning—the internal and external. They can be found alongside other styles of judicial
decision-making. In any particular judicial opinion that relies on systems analytics, they
are not necessarily the only reason or style of reasoning used; they may accompany other
forms of argumentation; and they are not always decisive.
In closing, to sharpen the idealtype, it may be useful to offer a foil, an example of
its opposite. Here we could look to Judge Shira Scheindlin’s opinion in the New York
City stop-and-frisk litigation for a contrasting idealtype. At the very beginning of her
opinion in Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Scheindlin writes:
I emphasize at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that this case is not
about the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This
Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its
effectiveness as a law enforcement tool. Many police practices may be useful for
fighting crime—preventive detention or coerced confessions, for example—but
because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter how effective.
“The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices
off the table.” 141
From the outset, Judge Scheindlin sets aside any consideration of the
effectiveness or necessity of stop-and-frisk to the criminal justice system. This is not to
argue that Judge Scheindlin’s ultimate resolution of the constitutional questions in Floyd
is automatically correct just because she avoids systems analytic reasoning. We would
need a much longer discussion on the merits to decide that question. The only point here
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is that systems analytics are effectively off the table and the notion of a “criminal justice
system” has been bracketed.

IV. A CRITIQUE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
There are, in my opinion, problems with this systems analytic approach in
criminal law and procedure. But to understand them best—to understand them
technically—we have to return first to the specific, technical area of systems analysis and
see where it went wrong.
A. The Problem with Systems Analysis
Systems analysis inverts the relationship between means and ends: It subsumes
social values and goods (such as education, health care, transportation, or security) to a
calculus that converts them into mere instrumentalities of policy decision-making.
Instead of systems analysis serving as a tool to ensure the proper implementation of
social ideals, systems analysis reshapes and distorts those very ideals and values—
“distorts” in the sense that it affects the balance of values in our society without openly
engaging, debating, confronting, or negotiating the very shift in the balance of ideals that
the method brings about. There are at least three dimensions to the problem.
First, the systems analytic approach assumes the fungibility of policy alternatives
regardless of the different values that they embody and reflect. As a result, the systems
analysis approach ignores the implications of policy choice on social ideals. In this
regard, the approach produces a radical inversion of politics—which can be illustrated
well by Quade’s observation, earlier, that “education, antipoverty measures, police
protection, and slum clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile
delinquency.” 142 Notice in this statement how a narrow objective—here, combating
juvenile delinquency—ends up taking priority over forms of implementation that have
fundamentally different values, such as an educated citizenry and a robust public sphere
(“education”), political and economic equality or equality of opportunity (“antipoverty
measures”), political freedom, security, and civil liberties (“police protection”), as well as
urban politics and planning (“slum clearance”). An innocent and narrow objective
(combating juvenile delinquency) has turned these different values into mere instrumental
goods. It has displaced political contestation. It has imposed, under the veil of neutral,
objective, positivistic science, a mechanism that will produce its own value outcomes.
The trouble is, the set of alternative policies cuts across multiple social ideals and
visions, and as a result, the policy output, if it is implemented, will necessarily affect and
shape the society we live in, its ideals and its values. It converts political goods—an
educated citizenry (education), equality (antipoverty measures), and security (police
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protection)—into mere levers of public policy, and imposes under a veil of neutrality a
new political condition. The traditional fix for this problem—namely, incorporating into
the welfare maximizing calculus the weighting of those values (for instance, discounting
the benefits of increased policing to reflect the loss of utility associated with decreased
liberty interests)—essentially either waters down or, if done robustly, undercuts the
systems analytic approach itself.
Second, by selecting more quantifiable objectives and variables, which the
method itself demands (for instance, juvenile delinquency rates) rather than larger social
values (for instance, youth welfare), or even larger social ideals (such as, for instance,
freedom or education), and by focusing exclusively on measurable outcomes, the systems
analytic approach privileges the more quantifiable, measurable, and instrumental factors
in the analysis. It is always going to be those variables that can be measured more easily
(such as arrest rates or convictions or deaths) that are going to be privileged over more
qualitative or soft variables. And the fact is, the more easily measurable, quantifiable, and
instrumental factors tend to be associated with the harder social systems (such as the
military or prison system), rather than education or community stability. As a result,
systems analysis itself has a particular tilt that favors certain types of outcomes.
Educational alternatives often will get short shrift because of the difficulty of assessing
their long-term benefits. Poverty reduction and other “soft” variables will be more
difficult to measure in terms of impact and outcomes. The hard edge of the systems
analysis approach simply favors hard systems.
Third, systems analysis takes for granted the construction of social problems and
the boundaries of social systems, and thereby insulates the formulation of the problem
from deeper critical investigation. The method assumes an agreed-upon problem and a
shared understanding of its scope—in particular, of the system in question. There is
nothing in the model to assess or compare or determine which problems society should
address. The method thus begins with the collection of promising alternative policies. As
a result, the approach shifts attention away from how the social problem has been chosen,
constructed, and legitimated, and how prioritizing that particular problem in that social
system may affect society. It effectively isolates problem-solving from problemproduction, and in the process hinders an open debate over the full consequences of
choosing a particular package of social problems to address as a society.
All three dimensions of the problem are illustrated well in the Liechenstein study
from 1971, so let’s return there for a moment. 143 Based on the close analysis of the
different alternatives, the Liechenstein report found that the most efficient technique was
police manning. Policing trumped education or recreation in terms of efficiency. 144 The
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systems analysis had value effects. And the City ultimately implemented very similar
policy solutions, focused precisely on increased policing and manpower. After a 63-yearold woman in a Lower East Side project was killed, Simeon Golar, chairman of the New
York City Housing Authority, instituted a “‘100-man mobile task force’ consisting of 40
housing policemen and the hiring of 60 new policemen.” 145 There followed a $500,000
initiative to hire armed and unarmed guards for the city’s housing projects, as well as a
$1 million allocation for security and surveillance equipment. 146 The increased police
manning was also accompanied by stricter judicial sentencing. There was a perceived
sense in the media and among politicians that lax judicial practices had contributed to the
crime epidemic. 147 These combined policy interventions would fuel increased
incarceration in New York State that would contribute, starting in 1973, to what has come
to be known today as mass incarceration. 148
The NYC RAND Institute’s systems analytic approach favored the police and
punishment-oriented solutions that were inherently more tangible, measureable, and
quantifiable—these were the type of policy levers associated with metrics that were
easier to quantify, to collect, to code, and to regress. This is, after all, natural; it is far
easier to quantitatively study criminal justice metrics (such as arrests, searches,
convictions, or police force) than it is to study the long-term consequences of education,
poverty-relief, or neighborhood trust.
Other illustrations abound in other contexts. Here is an illustration from the clean
air context: a study conducted by Daniel Klein titled “Fencing the Airshed: Using
Remote Sensing to Police Auto Emissions,” and published in a collection called The
Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues in
we have presented here is further testimony to the paucity of formalized design procedures for translating
security goals into detailed system requirements. The present crime situation has created an undeniable
demand for quantitative models which can account for behavioral and sociological phenomena which can
adequately predict the impact of security measures on society, and which can clarify our presently fuzzy
notions of what security really means.”) Nevertheless, the City implemented the policies that topped
Liechenstein’s study.
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2003. 149 The narrow objective in that study is to reduce pollution through lower auto
emissions—again, the problem itself and the fact that it demands our attention and
resources has been assumed. The analysis collects a number of alternative policies
without much regard for the social implications of each, including “carpooling programs,
emissions requirements on new cars, electric vehicle quotas, and alternative fuel
mandates,” as well as emissions inspection testing. 150 Notice that these have different
valences, but that the alternatives are nevertheless made fungible. Most of these
alternatives involve a command-and-control approach.
According to the study, however, cost-benefit analysis reveals a more efficient
alternative: policing auto emissions using “remote sensing” technology. The basic
components of such an approach would include (1) manned and unmanned remotesensing units policing the highway, accompanied by automatic license plate readers; (2)
monetary fines imposed on gross polluters, with the added sanction of vehicle
impoundment; and (3) “on-road pullover teams” that would stop “on the spot” cars
exhibiting “a suspicious feature,” “subterfuge or rank noncompliance.” 151 Upon close
analysis, the report finds that this latter alternative is indeed the most cost-efficient:
“Besides offering lower costs, the remote-sensing approach delivers more air quality
benefits than do smog check and other command-and-control policies.” 152 So rather than
regulate the auto industry or provide it with incentives to produce lower emission cars, or
impose energy regulation, the optimal approach is to police the highways more. No need
for licensed inspection stations, cumbersome regulation, or the like. Pullover teams and
unmanned policing units will do the job better. “The likely result,” in Klein’s words, “is
less bureaucracy and cleaner air.” 153
But notice, again, how the objective policy-machine here ends up having
important effects on society and directly affects the balance of values such as liberty,
equality, wealth distribution, civil rights, etc. The public policy analysis, it turns out,
changes our environment—it shapes our society. In the Klein study, the country may be
saddled with a far greater number of highway patrol officers, which may or may not
reflect our values. (And of course, the political effects can go either way. The policy
outcome could be single-payer universal health care, more public education or Head Start
programs). In sum, by taking for granted the construction of the social problem, by
choosing a narrow, quantifiable objective, by focusing on more measurable outcomes,
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and by costing-out “fungible” policies, the systems analytic approach shapes our value
system without ever having explicitly engaged in debate.
B. Demonstration: A Simplified Proof
Let me demonstrate the problems with the systems analytic approach using as
simple and non-technical means as possible—to avoid an opaque model that itself may
subtly insert assumptions in the premises of the analysis. I believe this can be done, or at
least, that is my burden. This will require a few steps, given that the straightforwardness
of the analysis may call for replies and rebuttals.
a. A first cut: Distorting existing preferences
Let’s say, hypothetically, that Americans in the aggregate would like to distribute
their resources in line with their ideals in the following manner: 50% to education, 35%
to health care, and 15% to policing. We could map their preferences for clarity (call them
“utilities” if you prefer, or “budgets,” or “priorities,” and visualize these preferences by
means of the following simple graph:
Police

Health Care

Education

35%

15%

50%

This distribution of goods corresponds, let’s say, to a certain weighting of social
values that puts a priority first on an educated and healthy citizenry (let’s call this
liberty), and secondly on security and orderliness (let’s call this order). Again, to keep it
simple and take only two ideals, we could visualize the relationship as follows. The first
values (the liberty associated with an educated and healthy citizenry) are, hypothetically,
twice as important as the second set (orderliness and security):
Order

Liberty

0%
33%

67%

Now let’s say that we pick a social problem—for instance, crime or juvenile
delinquency—and we decide to take a systems-analytic approach to the problem. As
analysts, we would begin by choosing the corresponding narrow objective—here,
reducing crime or juvenile delinquency—an objective that we can all agree on easily
once the problem has been posited. We then collect the most promising alternatives to
solve the problem. Let’s say, hypothetically, that there are three: (a) investing more in
publicly-funded Head Start programs for toddlers; (b) improving pre-natal health care for
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pregnant mothers, increasing drug rehabilitation programs, and investing in rapid
response emergency room care; or (c) increasing the police force. These alternatives are
entirely fungible, in the eyes of systems analysis. Then, we conduct detailed cost-benefit
analysis and we find that a similar monetary investment will have the greatest return if
the third policy, increasing the police force, is adopted. Based on the analysis, we
increase the number of police officers and the police budget to address the social
problem. Now, the distribution of political goods has changed, and our budget, or goods
allocation, looks something like this:

Police

Health Care

Education
33%

33%

33%

The redistribution and reallocation of resources, of course, has consequences on
what we are privileging in terms of ideals. We are now investing twice as much in
policing than we were before, and this has the following consequence on the type of
balance of ideals reflected in our society, with order and security now being
proportionally more important than before:
Order

Liberty

0%
57%

43%

By putting aside debate over our values and ideals, and simply focusing on a
narrow objective, systems analysis effectively has reshaped our social landscape and
modified our prevailing values. It has distorted our original preferences and vision—it
has altered the world that we want to live in.
By contrast, a more capacious approach that addresses head-on our initial
preferences would seek to keep the social values as the primary driver of policy
interventions. That would translate, perhaps, in this case, into a combination of programs
that would invest, say, 50% of resources into Head Start programs, 35% into emergency
care improvement, and 15% into increased police—in order to maintain the balance of
values as they were originally, to maintain the earlier balance.
b. A second cut: Maximizing the wrong thing
At this point, a proponent of systems analysis might respond that it would be easy
to factor in preferences regarding ideals in such a way that the analysis would take full
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account of people’s values. Let’s assume that, as a result of the increased investment in
policing, overall social welfare may be lower than what we might have expected from the
crime drop, because of a shared distaste for living in more of a police state; in other
words, the benefits of reduced crime (or cleaner air in the Klein study) are offset to some
degree by the change in police landscape. That, the proponent will say, can be factored
into the analysis. The analyst need only include in the model the distaste (disutility)
associated with the shift toward a police state. Preferences along these lines can also be
measured and quantified, and made part of the overall welfare calculus. The problem, in
other words, can be addressed easily by factoring in people’s tastes and preferences—
which should have been done from the beginning, in fact.
Now, if we etch those preferences too deeply into the analysis, then we will
simply be back at square one: We will weight our preferences so strongly that our values
will determine policy outcomes. If the analysis is going to factor in our taste for police
surveillance robustly—as well as all our other tastes for security, for order, for civil
liberties, for equality, for an educated citizenry, and so on—then the model is essentially
rigged to produce the outcomes that reflect our social values and judgments. The analysis
will reproduce the landscape we want to see realized. What becomes unclear, then, is
how deeply to etch our preferences into the model. But the degree of commitment to
ideals, the strength of one’s convictions and values, can also be measured and included in
the model, a proponent might reply. There is no reason to believe that preferences are
etched in stone and that there can never be any trade-offs. A new social problem may
have effects on the vision that we have for society.
So, proponents of systems analysis might argue, after having incorporated those
preferences into the model, a systems analytic approach can find real efficiencies that will
actually result in increased welfare and greater utility overall. For instance, systems
analysis might find efficiencies, say, by using police to address juvenile crime, that will
outweigh the disutility and that would thereby allow us to invest savings into education
and poverty-reduction. Even though there may be a shift in ideals, a proponent may
argue, Americans will value the end state more. They will gain some orderliness
proportionally to liberty, but will be happier overall based on their own tastes,
preferences, or utilities.
This is, of course, the welfare economist’s response—a type of response
consistent, for example, with Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s thesis in Fairness
versus Welfare (2002). 154 In fact, Kaplow and Shavell say precisely this. As they write
and emphasize, “The conception of individuals’ well-being that we consider, in the
tradition of welfare economics, is a comprehensive one. It encompasses not only the
direct benefits that individuals obtain from the consumption of goods and services, but
also individuals’ degrees of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything
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else that they value. What factors are included in well-being—and with what weight—is
understood subjectively, in terms of what actually matters to individuals.” 155
As if anticipating the earlier critique, Kaplow and Shavell add: “An implication of
our broad definition is that even tastes for fairness are included: Just as an individual
might derive pleasure from art, nature, or fine wine, so might an individual feel better
with the knowledge, for example, that vicious criminals receive their just deserts. This
view, under which tastes for fairness are counted with a weight to be determined
empirically, based on the actual weight, if any, that individuals place on such tastes, must
be sharply distinguished from the view of notions of fairness as independent evaluative
principles, which is the subject of our critique.” 156 In other words, welfare economics can
incorporate peoples’ tastes, preferences and values regarding social and political ideals—
and still optimize, i.e. shift policies around in order to find efficiencies that can be
reinvested in other political ideals.
This is undoubtedly right, at least at a theoretical level—or, at a minimum, I am
perfectly willing to assume that it is right. But the problem is, even from a welfare
economist’s perspective, that systems analysis is maximizing the wrong thing: it is trying
to resolve one particular social problem, rather than trying to maximize general social
welfare. In the process, there is absolutely no way to know whether the resolution of that
particular systemic problem has increased or decreased overall welfare, or whether there
are other policy alternatives regarding other social problems that would do better at
promoting overall social welfare. In other words, from an internal perspective—internal
to welfare economics—systems analysis is dangerous: it is trying to optimize the wrong
objective.
In this sense, it is not necessary to address the details of Kaplow and Shavell’s
specific argument about law enforcement, 157 because we can remain at a higher level of
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abstraction. At that higher level, though, it is crucial not to engage in partial welfare
analyses by focusing on one social system. That would simply distort overall welfare. 158
Another way to say this is that systems analysis does not address the question of
how a particular social problem, or social system for that matter, becomes the focus of
our problem-solving. The problem of crime was turned into a major national issue at a
particular moment in history—in about 1964, during Barry Goldwater’s presidential
campaign—and would become a key campaign issue for Richard Nixon. In part as a
backlash to the Civil Rights movement, and for other reasons as well—including the rise
of the anti-War and other social movements, racial conflict, and increased crime rates—
crime would become in the 1960s a social problem that would trump others—housing,
poverty, public health, etc. 159 But there was nothing natural or obvious about that.
Illiteracy, malnourishment, poverty, racism, inequality, homelessness, etc. could also
have remained or become more pressing social issues.
In other words, we construct, we produce social problems, we render visible
certain social issues, often through a crisis—and we keep invisible other social
problems—in a way that then puts onto our counting table particular costs and benefits. It
is in the production of problems as problems that we produce the possibility of shifting
social values. We render visible one problem, while other problems remain invisible and
illegible. In the process, we load the systems analysis with very specific concerns that
have identifiable implications. We shape the balance of our ideals by means of problem
creation. The only way to do systems analysis properly, without causing systemic
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distortion, is to do general welfare analysis at the highest and broadest level. Barring that,
the analysis is inevitably going to insert error. 160
c. The Limited Role of Systems Analysis
Does that mean, in the end, that there is no role for systems analysis or
operations research, or more generally cost-benefit analysis? No. There are a few roles, of
course. First, there is an important role for program evaluation: Assessing the
effectiveness of interventions remains, unquestionably, necessary. If programs are not
contributing to a stated objective, that’s important information to have; for example, if
broken-windows policing, stop-and-frisk policies, or gun-oriented policing are or are not
reducing serious crime, it’s important to know in order to decide whether to engage in
those enforcement practices. 161 But, second, in terms of comparing programs, costbenefit comparisons should be limited to a single value dimension. When we compare
different crime reduction alternatives, the alternatives have to be in the same register:
whether, for instance, hot-spots policing works better than broken-window policing—that
would be a fine question to ask. 162 Whether to do 911-style policing or beat policing—
that, too, is okay. But whether to invest in the COPS program or in Head Start—that has
to be off the table, because it is going to skew our balance of values. In other words, the
economic cost-benefit analysis should be modeled on operations analysis, not systems
analysis. Modeling, statistics, and cost-benefit analyses are fine in the operations research
context. It is when they are extended outside of the narrow system being analyzed and
encompass other social dimensions that the problems arise. Third, anything beyond the
narrow category of operations research (narrowly defined) should be purely informational
because it is, after all, skewed: the choice of a particular social problem and narrow
objective is far too outcome-determinative. Under no circumstance should such cost160

In this regard, I tend to agree with the welfare economists: if you go down the path of welfare, it has to
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for perfect efficiency could lead us to a perfectly regimented, militaristic, fascist regime in which the
benefits of efficiency outweigh the cost to political ideals among the citizenry. That, I take it, would
undermine the very point of our political union. In the end, it’s a vision for society that we need to
maximize, not the efficient embrace of fungible public policies.
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benefit analysis determine the budget, the planning, or the long-term programming of
social expenditures. Those are public decisions.
The systems analyst may be entirely right that there is room for achieving Paretooptimality here or there; but in that regard, the systems analyst is tinkering at the margin,
and narrow systems analysis—or rather, operations research—is no more than a
technical, applied skill that corrects for minor inefficiencies that no one would disagree
about or contest. In effect, operations research should be understood as nothing more than
an applied program in an economics department—not a separate school or division of its
own, and certainly not a broad approach to decision-making. In those limited terms,
operations research has a lot to contribute. 163
In the end, the crux of the problem occurs when we expand operations research
outside the discrete box where objectives and alternative policies overlap in values—or,
to say the same thing, when we chose to compare alternative policies that encompass
very different values. In operations research, the analysis focused on military objectives
and alternative military policies that overlap with corresponding politico-military values,
namely increased military security (offensive or defensive). The moment the analysis
extends beyond a single dimension of values, the analysis inverts the relationship
between policy and politics.

V. THE PROBLEM IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This critical perspective on systems analysis can inform our view of systems
analytic styles of judicial decision-making in the field of criminal law and criminal
procedure—along the same three dimensions.
First, the judicial adoption of a systems analytic approach distorts the legal
analysis by converting a particular practice into an objective necessity. It cloaks the
judicial decision-making in an aura of neutrality and gives the impression that the legal
determination is scientific and objective, rather than moral or normative. In the process,
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the judicial decision imposes, by means of the practices or policy at issue, a particular
balance of values and ideals. By achieving this under the guise of a systems analytic
approach, the decision-makers mask the value choices that they are imposing.
To take a concrete case, in McCleskey, discussed earlier, Justice Powell treats
discretion as a necessary element for the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system. Although the Court has not engaged sensu stricto in systems analysis—the Court
has not identified or compared all the promising alternatives—it is ranking the
discretionary practices in question as satisfying the system requirements, as satisfying the
“criterion” of the model. In doing so, it is treating “the criminal justice system” as (1)
having certain objective needs; (2) needs that can be determined neutrally, without
recourse to moral or normative argumentation; (3) by means of an analysis that is not
political in nature, but modeled on science. In McCleskey, the Court never admits that it
is imposing particular social values or engaging in an analysis that involves political
choices. In fact, the Court specifically severs the political dimension of the question by
suggesting that McCleskey should address his argument to the political branches, not
judicial decision-makers: “McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative
bodies,” Justice Powell writes. The clear implication is that the systems analytic
justification has avoided political or moral considerations. In Schlesinger’s words, it has
dealt with reality, not with morality—though we know that is not true.
Notice, importantly, that the systems analysis in McCleskey does not revolve
predominantly around crime reduction. Justice Powell has not adopted Packer’s crime
control model. The practices in question are not being measured along a criminological
dimension. Rather, the question is whether the practices are necessary to the smooth
functioning of the system. The objective is the functionality of the system—which
essentially represents, for the Court, an objective or neutral stance. Having a functioning
“criminal justice system” is, for the Court, an obvious and natural priority that does not
seem to trigger an evaluation of social values or ideals. But what the technical
examination of systems analysis reveals is that it is: the systems framework, the selection
of a model, the evaluation along a criterion can shift the balance of values in society. And
it does so precisely because all the different possible practices are not fungible substitutes
that simply promote the system’s objectives or functionality. Practices and policies need
to be evaluated in terms of how they are going to distribute and redistribute, or distort the
balance of values that we share as a society. Those effects should not occur blindly or by
the inadvertent effect of systems analysis.
Second, judicial decision-making that rests on systems analytic approaches tends
to select on the more quantifiable objectives and variables, such as crime control,
management efficiency, or system functionality, at the expense of higher-order and softer
social values, thus privileging the more measurable and instrumental factors. 164 Here too,
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in the context of the “criminal justice system,” those factors that can be measured more
easily—crime related variables, arrest rates or convictions—will get priority over more
qualitative or soft variables, such as racial equality. This is partially why, for instance,
Packer’s due process model is a watered down version of systems analysis or may not
even qualify. It is because those values of legality and fair notice are particularly difficult
to quantify, producing a hybrid model that has very little “scientific” traction. It’s too soft
to model. This is particularly problematic when we notice, with Malcolm Gladwell, that
heterogenous rankings that aspire to be comprehensive are particularly amenable to
distortion. 165
The Florence decision is, again, a good illustration. Justice Kennedy is able to and
does quantify some of the security risks: “This record has concrete examples,” he writes.
“Officers at the Atlantic County Correctional Facility, for example, discovered that a man
arrested for driving under the influence had ‘2 dime bags of weed, 1 pack of rolling
papers, 20 matches, and 5 sleeping pills’ taped under his scrotum.” 166 The Justices debate
a recent study of 75,000 new inmates over a five years period that found 16 instances
where a full body search revealed contraband. 167 By contrast, the liberty interests are far
less tangible, and as a result, do not weigh equally in the systems analysis. Strip searches
often include delousing showers, having to lift your genitals, and being forced to squatand-cough while someone is peering up you rectum or vagina: those liberty interests are
less easily quantified than the raw number of successful searches, even when they are as
low as 16/75,000. Florence is precisely a case where the more measurable, quantifiable,
and instrumental factors associated with the harder social systems—here, the jail
system—serve to tilt the analysis in a particular direction. The hard edge of systems
analysis, as noted earlier, favors hard systems.
Third, judicial decisions that rest on systems analytic justification tend to take for
granted the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system as an overarching
objective, thereby insulating the legal analysis from deeper critical inquiry. The approach
starts, at the outset, by assuming a consensus surrounding the objective of the system—
for instance, promoting the functionality of the criminal justice system, or improving
crime control, etc. The consequence is that there is little consideration of the larger
question how the objectives of the “criminal justice system” relate to other social
processes and values. Systems analytic approaches hinder a full debate over the larger
consequences to society. The fact is, though, that taking for granted the objective of a
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smooth functioning system of jails, of capital punishment, or of mass incarceration in this
country today is itself a position that requires justification.
In the judicial decision-making context, there is another more common critique of
systems analytic approaches that applies as well—namely, that the decision makers do
not necessarily have the skills, background, knowledge, or time to really implement the
type of quantitative analysis necessary to decipher the best alternative, so they tend to
guesstimate or “satisfice” and, in the process, simply confirm their personal biases. This
is the critique expressed by scholars such as Charles Lindblom, who would coin the idea
that policy makers just “muddle through,” and Herbert Simon, who coined the term
“satisfice.” 168 These are the critique surrounding the problem of bounded rationality.
While they are undoubtedly correct, 169 it is nevertheless important to also focus on the
internal critique that starts by assuming, with the proponents of systems analytic
approaches, that the method itself can be properly applied.

VI.

A CODA ON MODERN PUNISHMENT PRACTICES:
THE CASE OF MASS INCARCERATION

The problem in the area of crime and punishment is, of course, much larger than
the narrow issue of judicial decision-making based on a systems analytic approach. The
problem goes far deeper, and entails far more troubling social outcomes. Punishment
practices more generally, today, are often operationalized through a systems analytic
approach: we tend to approach these matters from the perspective of a “criminal justice
system,” with its objectives and needs (e.g. crime reduction, population management,
etc.), and then pursue policies that most efficiently advance those objectives. In the
process, we ignore many other important dimensions.
Mass incarceration—or more appropriately, the hyper-incarceration of inner-city,
minority young men—is a tragic example of this. To be sure, it is the product of a
complex interaction of micro- and macro-level factors including national and local
politics, sentencing reforms, racial discrimination, perceptions of crime, and special
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interest lobbying, over the course of forty years. 170 But systems analysis facilitated the
phenomenon, especially at the level of ideas and justification.
The theory of “selective incapacitation”—which would morph into mass
incarceration—was originally theorized by the RAND Corporation and developed
precisely as a systems “fix” to the excessive cost of the prison system. A few years after
the New York City RAND Institute closed its doors, in the early 1980s, RAND
established the Habitual Offender Project. That project would focus on the strategy of
“selective incapacitation” as a new and promising, cost-effective measure to combat
crime.
The idea of selective incapacitation was premised on the empirical observation
that a limited number of offenders tend to commit a disproportionally large percentage of
offences. If true, and if those individuals could be identified, then in theory it would be
efficient to focus on those high-rate offenders and imprison them for longer terms, rather
than incarcerate low-rate offenders. The RAND project originated in response to studies
of California prisons that revealed, surprisingly, no real differences in prison sentences as
between low and high rate offenders. The idea behind the RAND project was to
efficiently reshuffle inmate sentencing: By locking up high-rate offenders for longer
periods, a state could both reduce its crime rate and simultaneously decrease its prison
population. The policy promised budgetary savings and reduced crime.
Peter Greenwood, with Allan Abrahamse, issued a RAND report in 1982 that set
forth the most fully articulated plan for implementing the strategy of selective
incapacitation. 171 Titled “Selective Incapacitation,” the report began as follows: “The
American system of criminal justice is now at a crossroad. Deprived of rehabilitation as
an organizing theme, pressed by a fearful and dissatisfied public to provide greater
protection from violent crimes, saddled with dangerously overcrowded and decrepit
prisons, and facing the prospect of severely limited resources to carry out its functions,
the justice system is now searching for new ways to control crime.” 172 The report studied
the feasibility of one such new way: predicting future dangerousness in order to impose
lengthier sentences on habitual offenders. The study then tried to estimate the costeffectiveness of selecting on dangerousness.
The researchers based their prediction research on self-report surveys from 2,100
male prison and jail inmates from California, Michigan and Texas in 1977. 173 They
focused on robbery and burglary offenses, excluding more serious crimes such as murder
or rape (given that low-base-rate crimes are so much more difficult to predict) and
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developed a seven factor test to identify high-rate offenders (focusing primarily on prior
criminal record, history of drug abuse, and employment history). They assigned each
offender a score from zero through seven: a positive response on any one of these seven
factors resulted in one point on the offender’s score. The resulting score was used to
distinguish between low, medium or high rate offenders. When the researchers tested
their predictions, they found that their test identified low- and medium-rate offenders
with greater ability than high-rate offenders: 91 to 92 percent of those scoring 0 or 1—
the lowest possible scores—turned out to be low- or medium-rate offenders; by contrast,
only 50 percent of those scoring 5, 6 or 7 turned out to be high-rate burglars or
robbers. 174
Despite the poor results, Greenwood concluded the study on an up-beat note:
“Increasing the accuracy with which we can identify high-rate offenders or increasing the
selectivity of sentencing policies can lead to a decrease in crime, a decrease in the prison
population, or both. Selective incapacitation is a way of increasing the amount of crime
prevented by a given level of incarceration.” 175 Even though Greenwood found that
predicting future dangerousness was inexact—and five years later would revise the report
and issue it with a slightly different title: “Selective incapacitation revisited: why the
high-rate offenders are hard to predict” 176—Greenwood nevertheless painted an
optimistic picture from what were not very cost-efficient conclusions:
Among California robbers, we found that a selective incapacitation strategy that
reduced terms for low- and medium-rate robbers while increasing terms for highrate robbers could achieve a 15 percent reduction in the robbery rate with only 95
percent of the current incarcerated population level for robbery. An unselective
attempt to increase incapacitation effects by increasing terms for all robbers
equally requires a 25 percent increase in population to bring about the same 15
percent reduction in crime. Among burglars, the best selective policy required a 7
percent increase in prison population to bring about a 15 percent reduction in
crime.
In Texas, we found that additional incapacitation effects would be much
more expensive. For robbers it would require a 30 percent increase in
incarceration level to achieve a 10 percent reduction in crime. For burglars, a 15
percent increase in incarceration would be required to achieve a 10 percent
reduction in crime. This higher cost is due to the low offense rate among Texas
inmates. 177
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A close reading of these conclusions reveals that the crime reduction benefits
required—in three out of four cases—increased prison populations. In effect, the idea of
selective incapacitation had already morphed into the theory of mass incapacitation.
Nevertheless, the Greenwood report had high impact and contributed importantly to the
rise and theoretical prominence of incapacitation theory, which undergirded a massive
increase in prison populations in the United States. 178 The report was inducted into the
operations research cannon of criminal justice—as least, according to Blumstein. In the
group of OR missionaries, Peter Greenwood featured prominently. 179
Greenwood’s study, though, smacked more of systems analysis than operations
research—which was precisely the problem. It focused on a narrow objective and then
evaluated one particular policy alternative that clearly had a distinct political valence,
without addressing the politics. It is precisely these kinds of systems analysis approaches
that are dangerous, because, in narrowing in on a consensus objective, they set aside an
open and frank debate about our values and ideals. The analysis miserably failed to
consider all of the negative consequences that the practice entailed—and this blindness
has continued to plague the topic of mass incarceration. To take but one: the toll on
citizenship. There is practically no consideration, today, for what mass incarceration does
to the civic engagement of the more than 2.2 million persons held behind bars or to the
more than 7 million persons under correctional supervision. Amy Lerman and Vesla
Weaver have begun to document some of the more measurable effects of incarceration on
public citizenship. They have shown how contact with the correctional system reduces
participation in democratic politics and carries with it a “substantial civic penalty”: it
produces a large, negative effect on “turning out to vote, involvement in civic groups, and
trusting the government,” taking into account the possibility of selection bias. 180 But even
here, the studies only consider the more tangible effects, and one can only wonder about
the much broader impact of such a massive prison system on the democratic citizenship
of large segments of our communities.
This is not to suggest that systems analysis caused mass incarceration—nor to
suggest that there are no evidence-based systems analytic strategies that could help
reduce mass incarceration today. The point, instead, is that systems analytic approach do
not take a sufficiently holistic approach to society and tend—I emphasize, tend—to focus
the analyst too narrowly on systems’ objectives. So, for instance, today, in the context of
decarceration, too many of the outcome-based systems analytic programs focus on the
release of inmates with low propensities for “dangerousness,” without examining how the
prediction of future dangerousness is coded for race and how these solutions skew even
further the racial imbalance in corrections. Similarly, the evidence-based systems analytic
strategies focus on the reduction of recidivism, when in fact, it is extremely hard to
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realistically affect recidivism. Instead of focusing so intensively on reducing
recidivism—the system’s primary focus—it may well be better, rather, to focus on
whether these programs reduce the very high likelihood that a reentering convict
overdoses or dies. The statistics here are frightening. But those, of course, are not viewed
as system needs, and so they do not rank high on the outcome metrics. Could we get it
right one day and do systems analysis better? Anything is possible, of course, but the
honest answer is: only if we can manage higher-level welfare analysis and do not remain
stuck within any particular system, especially the “criminal justice system.”

CONCLUSION
Extending the method of operations research beyond weapons systems and into
broader policy contexts and judicial decision-making has been “radical,” 181 to borrow
Edward Quade’s term—radical precisely for the reasons that Quade and his RAND
colleagues suggested: the approach takes no position on the relative worth of very
different kinds of practices that promote very different kinds of social values. Quade’s
pregnant remark that “education, antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum
clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile delinquency” 182 reveals the nub
of the problem. The simplicity of the statement exposes the central fault: the systems
analytic approach ingeniously displaces larger debate over the values that we hold as a
society. Systems analysis is an approach that seduces by offering the hope of avoiding the
quagmire of partisanship or, in Schlesinger’s words, “morality,” and by focusing our
attention on narrow objectives that no one could possibly object to—reducing crime or
juvenile delinquency, for instance. It cunningly proposes a disarmingly common sense,
neutral, and objective approach. Rather than get caught up in endless debates, we need
simply agree on more basic, measurable objectives (with an appreciation of resource
constraint), evaluate the different alternative ways of achieving those narrow objectives,
and then choose the most efficient alternative.
The systems analytic approach, however, masks rather than avoids value
judgments. It does so by privileging and rendering natural certain systems interests, while
ignoring the consideration of other social values. And it is at its worst when it stops
conversation: when it serves to stop the legal discussion short and prevent countervailing
values from ever get named or weighed in the analysis. In the end, the problem with
systems analytic approaches is that they do not sufficiently account for all the nonsystematic dimensions of the criminal sanction. Taking a systems analytic approach that
focuses on management efficiency, crime control, system functionality—or for that
matter, on family well-being or liberal legalism—is likely to produce judicial decisions
that fail to recognize and account for multiple and important social values. Robust
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citizenship, for instance, may simply fall by the way side because it is not easily
quantifiable.
In the end, the evolution from operations research to systems analysis, the
extension of systems analysis into government policy-making and, ultimately, into the
“criminal justice system,” and the contemporary effects on judicial decision-making and
legal thought are plagued with difficulties. The approach is seductively simple and
appealing, but it is an approach that maximizes the wrong thing—purportedly fungible
practices, rather than our shared values and ideals.
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